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1. Introduction 
The principal-agent relationship is a relationship in which one pa同yagrees with another to 
ca汀Yout some type of action on his or her behalf. The former party is called the principal， and the 
latter is called the agent. We could take， asan example， the relationship between the employer and 
employee. Considering such a relationship is concerned with delegated decision~making. If the 
principal has complete information about the agent's decisions and their consequences， or if there 
is no divergence of interests between them， there is no problem in a delegated decision-making 
relationship. The principal-agent problem arises in situations in which these conditions do not 
apply. 
Moral hazard often occurs in principal-agent relationships when the principal can not observe 
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the behavior of the agent after the contract has been signed， or at least， the principal cannot 
maintain total control of the action， and where there is some potential divergence of interests 
between them. For example， inthe employer-employee relationship， itis impossible for the 
employer to observe completely the employee's effo口inmost real situations. The employer can 
only infer the employee's e百ort合omhis performance ex-post. Moreover， the employee's interests 
can be in conf1ict with those of the employer because a cost for one is revenue for the otherl). 
Consequently， we have to design the contract as the means by which the employer and employee 
can be made compatible and moral hazard can be avoided. 
The remedies that are suggested by these two conditions (an ex-post informational 
asymmetry and the conf1ict of interests) are explicit monitoring of the employee's effort and the 
use of incentive contract. Monitoring the actions of an employee may make it possible to prevent 
inappropriate behavior before it occurs， but it may be， insome situations， too expensive to be 
worthwhile， or it may be impossible to observe the efforts. When the employer can observe 
outcomes even ifmonitoring is not cost-e仔ectiveand the employee's efforts are unobservable， the 
employer can provide incentives to encourage appropriate behavior of the employee through 
rewarding favorable outcome. However， very rare cases may occur in which there is a perfect 
correlation between unobservable efforts and resulting outcomes2)ラsothe employee has to decide 
his behavior under conditions of unce巾 inty.A decision under conditions of uncertainty is risky 
because there are a number of possible outcomes. Hence， the incentive problem of motivating the 
employee to act on behalf of the employer has two important aspects: what risks the employee 
takes， and how hard the employee works. 
The purpose of this paper is to consider what strategies are available for the principal to 
induce high e狂ortlevels企omthe agent. We will focus our discussion on the employer-employee 
relationship， particularly on the issues surrounding incentive pay. 
In Section 2， we first set out a precise formation of the decision-making situation in the 
principal-agent relationship， and examine the risk attitude of the participants. Secondly， the 
optimal risk sharing is considered. In Section 3， we discuss the linear compensation contract and 
derive the optimal choice of parameters. In Section 4， we consider a long-term contract in which 
the information about the employee's effort is modified by past perfo口nance.Finally， we make 
1) There are thre elements of the conflict of interests between the employer and employee. First， the employer is 
interested in the outcome， whereas the employee is not directly responsible for this aspect. Secondly， the employer is 
not directly interested in e仔ort，but the employee is keenly conscious of his e百ortbecause itis costly to him. Finaly， 
it is considered that greater efort would more likely lead to a beter outcome. 
2) For example， a salesperson's outcome depends not only on his efort but also on other uncontrollable factors， such 
as the price， advertizing， and market conditions 
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some comments on the limitation of incentive con廿act.
2. Delegated Decision-making 
The employment relationship is， ingeneral， embodied a form of contract， inwhich the obligations of 
each are specified. In particular， the contract signed by both parties stipulates the payments that the employer 
makes to the employee. We assume that the employer always designs the contract， and then it is offered to the 
employee. After having considered the terms ofthe contract， the employee must decide whether or not to sign 
it. The employee will accept the contract only if the utility obtained from it is greater than the utility obtained 
企omnot signing J). 
2.1. Observability of Effort 
The employee chooses the level of effort， which is costly to him and which mainly， but not completely 
determines the output of a production process. The employer receives the output and he pays the wage to the 
employee under the contract. Output and the payment to the employee are measured in monetary terms. The 
employer cannot directly observe the employee's effort and can only observe the performance ex-post. 
Suppose that the performance of business activities is: 
p = z+y， (2.1) 
where p is the firm's profit， z isan indicator of effort and y isan observable random variable， such 
as the industry trend. The indicator of effort， z isdivided intoれ-¥10parts: 
z= e +x， (2.2) 
where e is the employee's effort and x is a random variable， which is unobservable by the 
participants. Note that the employer cannot separately observe e and x， but can observe only their 
sum， z.The same level of observed z iscreated by many different combinations of e and x. Hence， 
the performance ofbusiness activities is: 
p = e + x + y. (2.3) 
For simplicity of keeping our discussion， assume that the two random variables x and y are each 
3) We exclude the case ofbilateral bargaining that agent may be make a counter ofer to the principal. 
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adjusted to have mean zero. Consequently， the profit can be assumed to depend on the employee's 
e任ort:
p = p(e). (2.4) 
Next， the employer receives the output ofthe employee's effort， that is， the firm's profit， and 
pays the wage to the employee. The employer's utility function is: 
Up = Up (p(e)-w). (2.5) 
On the other hand， the employee receives the wage and offers an effort， which implies some 
cost to him. We assume that the employee obtains utility企omhis wage， while greater effort means 
greater disutility for him. The employee's utility function is: 
UA = UA (w)-C(e)， (2.6) 
additively separable in the components wage， w and effort， e.Describing the employee's 
preferences by an additively separable function implies that his risk attitude does not vary with the 
e汀orthe supplies. 
2.2. Risk Attitudes 
When the participants face a risky decision-making， we must examine how they not only 
react to retum but also risk. The way of dealing with uncertainty is to introduce the statistical 
concept of probability into a theory of choice. The retum and risk are defined as the expected 
value， and the variance ofpossible outcome， which can be measured financially. 
Risk preferences are expressed by the utility function introducing the concept of expected 
utility. For the simplicity of analysis， we make two assumptions about the utility function. First， 
the utility function is assumed to be at least twice differentiable at al income levelsラwhichimplies 
continuity of the utility function. The first derivative of the utility function (the marginal utility of 
income) is always positive; U' > 0 because ofnon-satiation assumption 4). The second assumption 
concems the risk attitude surrounding uncertain incomes. Now suppose that the employee's 
income only consists ofhis wage and al the wage values which appears in them lie on the interval 
between the greatest wage value， Wmax and the smallest wage value， wmin' with probabilities， p and 
4) It implies that more is preたredto les. See Gravelle-Rees (1992， pp.68・78.)for the assumptions that give the 
desired properties to the individual's preference ordering 
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l-p， respectively， where 12 p 2 O. The expected value ofwage， W is then: 
E (w) = p W max + (1- p) W min = W. (2.7) 
Figure 1 illustrates three kinds of utility function， whose shapes are drawn by strictly 
concave (U"く 0)，linear (U" = 0) and strictly convex (U" > 0). Corresponding to the wage level， 
wmax and wmin are the utility values， UA(wmax) and UA(wmin)， atpoints A and B respectively. The 
expected utility of W is the weighted average ofthe utility ofrisky wages， wm出 andWmin at point 
C， then: 
E (UA(w)) =p[UA(wmax)]+(1 - p)[UA(wmin)]. (2.8) 
Ifthe employee will prefer receiving a certain wage of W to receiving a random wage with 
expected value of W， the utility of the certain wage of W would be greater than the expected 
utility of W: 
UA(W) > E (UA(w)) (2.9) 
This kind of risk attitude is called as risk averse and depicted by a strict concave utility function as 
shown in Figure 1-(1). 
Conversely， ifthe employee will prefer receiving a risky wage with expected value of w to 
receiving a certain wage of w， the utility of the certain wage of W would be smaller than the 
expected utility of W: 
UA(W)くE (UA(w)) (2.10) 
This kind of risk attitude is called as risk loving and depicted by a strict convex utility function as 
shown in Figure 1-(3). 
Finally， ifthe employee will be equivalent receiving a certain wage of W to receiving a 
random wage with expected value of W， the utility of the certain wage of W would be equal to 
the expected utility of w: 
UA(W) = E [UA( w)) (2.11) 
This kind of risk attitude is called as risk neutral and depicted by a linear utility function as shown 
in Figure 1-(2). 
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Certainty equivalent wage， Wc is defined as a certain wage whose utility is equivalent to the 
expected utility of w， that is: 
(2.12) UA(wc)ニE (UA( w)J . 
w: Thereforeヲcertaintyequivalent wage， Wc ofthe risk-averter is smaller than the expected wage 
(2.13) 
where Wc is found at a point D in Figure 1-(1). The distance between w and Wc shows how 
? ?? ?
Wcく w，
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much ofthe certain wage the employee would be willing to give up rather than face risky wages， 
W max and w min' It expresses the cost of risk、whichis caHed the risk premium， r. 
The risk premium depends on both the variability of possible wage and the agent's degree of 
risk aversion. Larger variability of possible wage leads to a greater risk premium (Figure 2-(1)). 
Larger concavity of utility function leads to a greater risk premium (Figure 2-(2)). 
The variability of possible wage is measured by Var (w)， which is the squared deviation of a 
random wage， w from its expected wageラ w.The degree of risk aversion is ref1ected in a form of 
concavity of utility function. A measure of the concavity of U A at the wage， w is shown in: 
A (w) = - U~ (w)/U~ (w)， (2.14) 
where U~ (w) is the rate at which marginal utility of wage changes with wage; U~ (w) < O. A (w) 
is a parameter of the employee's preferences， which is called the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion for gambles with meanう w.Through mathematical approximation by using Taylor‘s 
theorem， the risk premium5) is equal to one-half times the coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
times the variance ofthe wage: 
rニ ÷A(W)hr(W) (2.15) 
If the employee is risk averse (U~ く 0)司 A ( w) will be positive. Larger A ( w) or larger Var 
(w) lead to a larger risk premium. Thus， certainty equivalent incomeヲWcis rewritten by: 
wc= w-r=w 士A(w) Var (w) (2.16) 
If the employee is risk neutral (U~ = 0)， A (w) will be zero. The certainty equivalent wage Wc is 
found at a point C in Figure 1ー(2)，where Wc = W. Therefore， there is no cost of risk and the risk 
premmm lS zero. 
2.3. Optimal Risk Sharing Ignoring Incentives 
lt is generally assumed that the employee is risk averse with respect to his income and the 
employer is risk neutral. This is because the employeeラsincome mainly consists of his wageち
while the employer who hires a large number of employees is able to offset the risk by pooling. In 
a case where risks are to be shared between a risk-neutral employer with many employees and a 
5) For a more discussion on a measure of risk aversion and the risk premium， se Prat (1964) and mathematical 
appendix in Milgrom and Roberts (1992)， pp.246-247. 
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risk-averse employee， the optimal risk sharing is to shift al the risk of the employee onto the 
employer， who suffers no cost in bearing the risk. 
Suppose that there are only two economic situations， boom and bust， inwhich wages and 
their probabilities are wmax and wmin' P and (1 -p)， respectively. The expected value of wage is 
expressed in equation (2.7). 
If the risk-averse employee is guaranteed receiving a certain wage， wG in Figure 1-(1)， 
whose amount is above the certainty equivalent wage句 Wcand below the expected wage， w; Wcく
wG< W ラhisutility U A would be better of: 
UA (wc)-C(e) < UA (wG )-C(e). (2.17) 
On the other hand， for the risk-neutral employer， paying the guaranteed wage wG is more 
beneficial than random wages with the expected value of wage， W， since his utility Up would be 
also better of: 
Up( p(e)-wc) < Up( p(e)-wG ). (2.18) 
However， this contract ignores the incentive problem because it makes the employee's 
compensation absolutely risk仕eeand unrelated to outcomes. The optimal con仕actmust balance 
the need for risk sharing against the need to provide incentives as there is a risk-incentive trade-off. 
There are many types of incentive contracts in which pay is linked to performance for eliciting 
higher efforts仕omthe employee. In the next section we discuss a pay-for-perfoロnancecontract. 
3. Linear Incentive Scheme 
The relatively simple compensation contract that includes the provision of incentives is 0食en
found in actual employment contracts. For example， the employee may be paid a constant salary 
plus a fixed proportion for his performance. We consider here the pay-for-performance contract 
with Iinear incentive provision 6). 
It is assumed that the payment function is linear and depends on z and y. It is formulated as 
follows. 
W ニ w(z， y) =α+β(z + Y y)ニ α+β(e+x+yy) (3.1) 
Compensation consists of a constant amount，αplus a portion varying with the observable 
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elements， z and y. The parameterβdetermines the intensity of the incentives provided to the 
employee. The parameter y shows how much relative weight is given to the information variable 
y， comparing with the unobservable variable z (ニe+ x) to determine compensation. 
In designing the optimal incentive contract， first we have to define the objective function to 
be maximized and the constraints under which the contract makes this feasible， then examine the 
optimal choice ofparameters. 
The objective function is the total utility ofthe employer and employee which is expressed by 
the total certain equivalent income. The employee' s certain equivalent income， T A is the expected 
wage minus the cost ofhis effort minus any risk premium: 
TA=w qe)÷A(W)br(W) 
=α+β(eザザ)-C(e) 土ーA(w) Yar [α+β(e + X +y Y )]，
2 
where支andy are the mean levels of x and y and A( w) isthe employee‘s coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion. Assuming the sum of支 andy to be zero 7)， 
TA =α+βベ e)-÷A(W)β2Yar(x + Y y) 
The risk-neutral employer's certain equivalent income， Tp is: 
Tp = p(e)-w = p(e)一(α+βe).
Hence， the total certain equivalent income、Tris: 
Tr=TA十Tp= p(e)-C(e)ー 土A(w)β2Yar (x + y y). 
2 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
Next we specifシthefeasible set in this contract. Although the employee's choice of effort， e 
will depend on the other parameters (α，s，y)， he will choose the level of e that maximizes his 
certain equivalent income， TA. By differentiating equation (3.2) with respect to e and setting that 
derivative equal to zero， we obtain the feasible condition ofthe contract: 
6) The model that we discuss here is based on the model of inccntive compcnsation in Milgrom and Roberts (1992)， 
pp.21 5-23 I 
7) According to prope口ies of variance， when a，βand e are assumed to be constant， then Var 
[a+β(e+x+汐)]=β2Var(x+乃，).The formula for the v呂rianceof two random variables can be seen in Guiarati 
(1992)， pp.41-46 
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β-C(e) = 0， equivalently，β= C(e)， (3.5) 
which is called an incentive constraint. 
The employment contract is efficient if the parameters (α，β， y ) take values that maximize 
the total certain equivalent subject to the incentive constraint， 
m州 ε)qE)÷A(W)β2Yar(x +y y) s.t.β-C(e) = O.
Therefore， we must examine how the employeeラschoice of effort， e will depend on the parameters 
(α，β，r ). 
As far asαis concerned， the total certain equivalent income is not affected by αbecause 
it is not included in the objective function of equation (3.4). Hence， the efficiency of the contract 
does not depend on the value of α. This part of compensation partly satisfies the employee's risk 
preference (risk averse) because it can partly isolate the employee合omrisk by guaranteed 
compensatJon，α. 
3.1. The Intensity of Incentives 
The most central part of designing incentive contracts isto determine the optimal value of β， 
which expresses the intensity of the incentives. If we wish to fix the information weighting 
parameter yラthenlet Y = Yar (x + r y). The determinant factor of s can be specified using the 
Lagrange method. 
L=p(e) 制 ÷AW)β2y+λ[βC(e)] (3.6) 
To find the stationary points of L that satisfシthefirst-order conditions for a maximum， 
δL 
てー=p'(e)-C(e) λC"(e)=O (3.7) 
oe 
8L 
32=βA(w)Y+λ ニ O (3.8) 
Therefore‘ 
βA(w)Y=λ (3.9) 
Substituting equation (3.9)， (3.5) into equation (3.7). 
p' (e)一β-βA(w)YC"(e)=0 
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β_ p'(e) 
一一
I+A(有)VC"(e)
(3.10) 
Equation (3.10) shows that the optimal value of βdepends on four variables: the marginal gain 
ofeffort‘p'(e)， the accuracy of assessing performance， V， the agent's risk aversion， A (111)， and the 
agent's responsiveness to incentives司 C"(e).
The first factor determining the optimal value of βis the profitability of additional effort， 
p'(e). Since making extra effort is costly to the employee， he wiII put in the higher level of effort 
toward his task only if its additional profit is greater than its marginal cost. According to equation 
(3.10)， the optimal intensity，βis proportional to the marginal gain of effort， p'(e) provided the 
other three factors remain unchanged. 
The second factor is the precision of measuring the employee's performance， V. High 
precision co汀espondsto low values of the variance， V， strong incentives thus should be used 
according to equation (3.10). Conversely今whenthe precision of performance measurement is low， 
only weak incentives should be used. 
To measure performance highly precisely， the variance of (x + r y)must be decreased. The 
two random variables x and y cause the variability of wage which determines the risk premium. 
Thus， the optimal value of r， which determines the relative weight of observable variable， r 
should be chosen to minimize the variance of (x + r y). 
Var (x + r y)= Var (x) + r 2Var (y) + 2 r Cov(x， y). (3.11 ) 
By differentiating equation (3.11) with respect to r， we get the optimal value of r: 
Therefore， 
δ[Var(x+ }タ)
二 2r Var(y) + 2 Cov (x， y)= O. 
8r 
y-cov(x，y) 
-Var(y) 
(3.12) 
If x and yare independent， Cov (x， y) is zero. Thus， r isoptimaIIy chosen to be zero. If x 
and y are positively related， Cov(x，y) is positive. Thus， r should be negative. Conversely， ifx and 
y are negatively related， Cov(x，y) is negative. Then， r should be positive. 
The third factor is the risk aversion of the employee， the level of which is expressed by the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversionヲA(11). A smaII value of the coefficient means the low cost of 
risk bearing， provided the variance remain unchanged. In equation (3.10)ラ asA( w) decreases，β 
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increases. Hence， a les risk averse employee should to be provided with more intense incentives， 
and vice versa. 
The final factor is the employee's responsiveness to incentives， C可e)，which depends mainly 
on the ability ofthe employee's effort level to a釘ecthis observed performance. If the employee is 
working as a small pa口ofa large group， incentives have litle effect of eliciting higher effort 
because his ability to affect their ex-post observable performance is very smal!. Thus， incentives 
should be most intense in cases where the most responsible employee is involved in the task. 
3.2. Monitoring 
Monitoring the employee's action may make it possible to prevent inappropriate behavior 
before it occurs. This should be considered in relation to the intensity of incentives. That is， if
monitoring the employee's action by the employer reduces the level of variance， then it makes 
sense to choose a high value of β. But monitoring requires devoting the allocation of resources 
by the employer. 
To specifシwhatlevel of resources should be spent on monitoring， we suppose that the 
variance of the performance measure can be reduced at cost. This is achieved by denoting the 
minimum amount of monitoring cost achieving an error variance as low as the variance， V which 
is consistent with optimal contracts， by M(V). It is supposed here that M(V) is a decreasing 
function， which implies that a larger V entaiJs lower monitoring costs. In addition， M'(V) is 
assumed to be increasing， that is， the marginal cost of variance reduction is a rising function. 
Rewriting equation (3.4) to include the cost ofmonitoring: 
TT = p(e) 保 )-÷A(川 2V-M(V) (3.13) 
Differentiating of equation (3.13) with respect to V and setting that derivative equal to zero， we 
obtain the optimallevel of monitoring: 
Therefore， 
aTr __ ，_一一-A(引 sL-M'(V) =σ. av 2 
M仲 ÷A(W)β2
(3.14) 
(3.15) 
Equation (3.15) demonstrates that the marginal cost ofreducing V， which is - M'(V)， must be 
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e叫叩叩q中仰u凶削山a討i
In designing optimal incentive contracts、 setting intense incentives and measuring 
perfoηnance are complementary activities. Comparing two situations with the low and high levels 
of incentive intensity，β， ifβis low， the chosen level ofV is high， and ifβis high， V is low. In 
other words， when βis reduced‘fewer resources are spent on monitoring， and vice versa. 
Therefore， ass increases‘more resources should be spent on monitoring 
3.3. The Equal Compensation Principle 
U司lenan employee is conducting several activities as part of his job， the problem of 
providing incentives becomes complicated. We suppose that the employee is given two tasks (task 
I and task 2) which require the levels of el and e2. The employer can measure performance of the 
two tasks by observing the indicators of effort Zl (= el + Xl) and Z2 (= e2+ x2)， where Xl and x2 have 
expected values of 7 and ? It is assumed that the wage is paid to the employee according to a 
linear compensation scheme based on the two indicators of effort: 
w=α+β1(e1 +x1)+β2(e2 + x2). (3.16) 
The employee wiIl choose el and e2 tomaximize his or her certain equivalent income: 
TAニα+βい1+7)+β'(e'+7) -C(el + e2)-~ A (w )Var (βlX1十β2x2)(3.17)
2 
By differentiating equation (3.17) with respect to el and setting that derivative equal to zeroラ
βT， _，令ずニβ1-C'(…刊 (3.18) 
SimilarIy‘ 
βT. 今 白 内示二β"-C' ( e 1+ eL ) = 0 (3.19) 
Thereforeラ
βl二 β2ラ (3.20) 
whereβ1 is marginal gain of effort el and β2 is marginaI gain of effort e2. Therefore， equation 
(3.20) represents that marginal gain of effort Spending in each activity must be equal， which is 
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called the equal compensation principle. 
If the task 1 istotally unmeasurable by the employer， itsparameter of incentives， s I cannot 
play any role in eliciting higher level of effort to be spent the task 1. In other wordsラ βImayas 
well as be set to zero. According to this principle‘the incentive pay does not work well and the 
fixed salary is preferred for the employee who has to conduct multiple tasks including 
unobservable ones. Thus， the equal compensation principle imposes a serious difficulty on the 
incentIve contract. 
4. The Long-term Relationship 
When the employer-employee relationship is repeated during several periodsラ wemust 
examine whether repetition will atTect the nature of the contract. Such long-terrn relationships in 
which the information about the employee's etTort is modified by his past perforrnance in each 
period have positive and negative implications for designing the incentive contract. The positive 
side is the possibility of acquiring reputations， and the negative side is known as the ratchet etTect. 
4.1. The Ratchet Effect 
Using information about past perforrnance as the base on cu汀entstandard can reduce the 
variance in the measurement of the perfo口nanceof the next period in case that the same random 
variable operates over the extended periods. The perfoロnancestandard tends to increase after a 
period of good perforrnance and decrease after bad perforrnance. This tendency is called the 
ratchet effect. 
Suppose that an employee works for two periods and his e任ortin each period is denoted by eJ 
and e2ヲ butthat the inforrnation about the employee's etTort used in the contract in the second 
period is modified by the performance ofthe first period. 
The employer can only observe the employee‘s performance ZJ (= eJ+xJ) inthe first period 
and Z2 (= e2 + X2) inthe second period， where random variables in the two periods‘xJ and x2 are 
assumed to have equal variances and to have means equal to zero. The employee‘s incentive 
compensation in the first period is: 
wJ-αJ+βJ (eJ+xJ +y YJ)' (4.1) 
If random variables in each period， XJ and X2 are attributed to the same factorsラ itis 
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appropriate for there to be a positive correlation between X1 and X2・Theobserved perforrnance of 
the employee's effort in the frst period， ZIcan be used to get an estimate X2 ofx2， which may be 
expressed as a function of ZI: 
£2=δ(ZI) =δ(e1 + x1). (4.2) 
In tum， the estimate主canbe used to get a better estimate ofthe employee's actual e百ortez inthe 
second period. Thus， an estimate of the employeeヲssecond-period performance Zz adjusted by the 
first-period perforrnance ZI is: 
Z2 = Z2一主=Z2-δ(ZI) = e2+ Xz一δ(e1+ x1). (4.3) 
Part of the perforrnance variation is x2-0 (e1 + x1). Ifδis carefully selected， then Var(x2-
o (e1 + x1) is smaller than Var(x2). This adjusted estimate， Z2 should be used in the contract 
because reducing the eηor around the employee's choices are estimated to increase the total 
certainty equivalent. 
羽市巴nthe employee's second-period pay， w2 isgiven by the same kind of function as in the 
frst period， the employee's total compensation over the two periods is: 
w1 +w2二 αl十αz+β1(e1 + x1 + r 1yl) +β2(e2+x2+ Y2YZ). (4.4) 
If the adjusted employeeラssecond-period pay‘wz* isdeterrnined by the basis on accounting 
the first-period， ZI'then the employee's total compensation over the two periods is: 
w1+w2*=α1+α2+β1 (e1 + x1 + Y 1 yl) + 
β2(e2+x2 -o(e1+x1)+ Y2Y2) 
=α1+α2 + (β1-δβ2) (e1 + x1)+β2 (e2 + x2) +βlY 1 yl
+s2Y2Y2 (4.5) 
It is important to note that the coefficient of e1 inequation (4.5) is notβ1 but the smaller amount 
(βI一δβ2).
When the second-period's bonus is given in proportion to the difference between actual 
perforrnance in the second periodラZ2(士、+x2) and the plan target， 0 (e1 + x1)， which is based on 
the frrst-period's perforrnance， ZI(= e1 + x，)higher first-period's effort， e1 increases the plan target 
in the second period. That is called the ratchet effectラwhichreduces the compensation accruing in 
the second period by δβ2・Ifthe employee engages in the job in both periods and foresees this 
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possibility ex-ante， he would refuse to expend higher effort in the first period， since the ratchet 
effect unfairIy penalizes good performance by decreasing the next periodヲscompensation through 
setting higher performance standard. Therefore， the ratchet effect is a kind of inefficiency in the 
linear incentive contract because it diminishes performance in each period in the repeated 
contracts. 
4.2. Efficiency Wages 
Reputation accumulated by repeated good behavior is highly valuable for the employee 
because it is very hard to build and maintain， however， itis very easy to lose by only one 
occuηence of inappropriate behavior. When the employee司se釘urtis difficult to observe， the 
employer may plausibly use the performance of the employee in the past as an indicator of present 
or future effort. The idea of reputation makes sense only under conditions of asymme廿ic
information. If the employer effectively introduces reputation of the employee as con廿act
enforcers， the employer can eIicit higher effort仕omthe employee without highly monitoring cost， 
or the use of costly and complicated legal contracts. The point is that the value ofreputation has to 
exceed the gain合omshirking for the employee. This is formalized as the efficiency-wage theory 8). 
It argues that the employee wiI be offered rent in order to increase productivity. The effective 
wage theory does not emphasize that increased productivity leads to higher wages， but higher 
wages lead to increased productivity. 
For simplicity of the analysis， we assume that the employee can choose between only two 
possible e釘urtlevels: minimal effort (e = 0) and some fixed positive level of effort (e > 0). There 
are only two states for the employee at any point in time: employed or unemployed. When he is 
unemployed， he receives unemployment benefits of Wu and he expends minimal effort (e = 0). The 
period of unemployment during the search for a new job is denoted by a probability b per unit 
time， which will be taken as exogenous. If the employee expends his effort at some fixed positive 
level (e > 0)， he receives a wage of w. On the other hand， ifhe expends his effort at minimal level 
(e = 0)弓 andonly if he is caught shirkingラhewill be fired. The probability ofbeing caught shirking 
is denoted by q per unit oftime. 
The employee would decide his effort's level to maximize his discounted utility stream. This 
involves his comparing the utility from shirking with the utility仕omnot shirking. We denote the 
8) The e貸iciencywage model discussed here is based 011 Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) 
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expected Iifetime utility of an employed shirker by Ves， the expect匂巴dlifetime utilit守yof an 
employed nonshirke釘rby Ve1λ
、
The児巴 抗向md白am巴叩nt匂剖alass巴tequa託副tion9勾)for a shir比k巴釘rIおsgiven by: 
r V e S = W+ (b + q)(V u -V e S )， (4.6) 
where interest rate times asset value equals flow benefits， which is wage， w plus expected capital 
gains (or losses)， that is， the probability of unemploymentヲ (b+ q) times unemployment 
compensation， Vu minus the opportunity cost of gain from shirking， (b+ q)VeS. Equation (4.6) can 
be rearranged to give: 
r Ve
s十(b十q)Ve
S= W + (b + q)Vu 
Therefore， 
VeszW+ (h + q)凡
r+h+q 
(4.7) 
While for a nonshirker， the fundamental equation is: 
r Ve
N = W - e +b(V u - V乃， (4.8) 
where the annual payment is wage， w minus the positive level of e百ort，e plus the gain of 
unemployment， bVu minus the opportunity cost of gain from nonshirking， bVeN. Equation (4.8) can 
be solved for Ve
N
: 
?
?
?
? ?
?
?
?
????
?
?
?
?
???
?
?
(4.9) 
9) We assume that the employee is infinitely lived， and has a pure rate of time preterence of r， which is represented by 
the interest rat巳 τheexp巴ctedpresent value of perpetual utility (the expected lifetime utility)， Ve is equal to the 
annual payment P divided by the interest rate r.By using the present value formula 
Voニ工+ p + p + ー
--~ ~--
I +r (1+r)2 (1 + r)3 
Now let P/(l +r) = a and 1I(l十r)= x.Then we have 
[1] Yc = a(l+x+x'+一)
MlIltiplying both sides by x， we have 
[2] Yc x = a (x+ x'+…) 
Substracting [2]仕om[1] gives us 
Yc (l ~x)=a 
Therefore， slbstituting for a and x 
1 P 
Yp(l--'-' -)= 
I+r 1+1 
Multiplying both side by (l+r) and rearranging ives 
[3] rYc = P 
S巴eBrealey and Myers (1996)， p.38 
??? ???
The employee will choose not to shirk ifVe
N 2: VeS• By using equation (4.7) and (4.9)， the 
no-shirking condition can be written as: 
(w-e)+bV;!. > W+(b+q)九
r+b r+b+q 
Therefore， 
w2: rVu十(r+ b + q) e / q三 w. (4.10) 
Equation (4.10) highlights the basic implication of the no・shirkingcondition. If the employer pays 
a sufficiently higher wageラwthan the critical wageヲ w，then the巴mployeewill not shirk. The 
difference between w and 長 iscalled the rent， which is the excess of eamings in the current job 
over opportunities elsewhereラinorder to prevent the employee企omshirking. This rent makes the 
job valuable and makes the prospect ofbeing fired in the future one to be avoided to the employee. 
The greater the rent， the greater the penalty仕ombeing fired because the employee suffers a big 
income los. Thereforeラahigher wage motivates the employee and leads to increased productivity. 
Moreover， it reduces labor tumover， enabling the firm to a町actmore productive labor. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have discussed the employment contracts using the principal-agent model. In 
particular， how to avoid moral hazard in delegated decision-making is considered by designing 
optimal incentive contract. In cases in which the employer is risk neutral and the employee is risk 
averse， efficient incentive contracts should balance the cost of risk bearing and the incentive gains. 
The optimal contract is govemed by the values of parameters (α，β， r ) which maximize the total 
certain equivalent income subject to the incentive constraint. To sum upヲincentiveintensity should 
be strengthened， 
(a) as the marginal gain of e狂ortincreases 
(b) as the employee、sperformance starts to be precisely measured 
(c) as the employee becomes les risk averse 
(d) as the employee becomes more responsible for the perおrmance
When we consider the long-run employment contract， the ratchet e百ectand reputation have to be 
taken into account to design an efficient contract. 
The incentive contract is effective， but it has limitations as a device to elicit higher employee 
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efforts because the equal compensation principle and the ratchet effect impose serious constraints 
on the incentive compensation formulas. The exist巴nceof reputation shows a preference for an 
altemative type of contract， such as efficiency wage contract. E狂iciencywage contracts would be 
more effective in eliciting higher effort levels of the employees w_hen monitoring the performance 
is very di百icultin such situations where the equal compensation principle can be operated. It can 
be considered that a higher wage is a substitute for close monitoring. To conciude， we have to 
carefully design the optimal employment contract considering the type of job， the employee's risk 
attitude， number of periods and general circumstances. 
References 
Baker， G. P. (1992)，"Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement，" Journal of Political 
Economy， Vol. 100， No. 3， pp. 598-614. 
Brealey， R.A. and Myers， S.(1996)ヲPrinciplesofCorporate Finance， 5th ed.， McGraw-Hill. 
Freixas， X.， Guesnerie， R.and Tirole， J.(1985)， "Planning under Incomplete Information and the 
Ratchet五百ect，"Review of Economic Studies， Vol. 52， pp. 173・191.、
Gaynor・ヲ M. and Pauly， M. V. (1990)， “Compensation and Productive Efficiency in Partnerships: 
Evidence企omMedical Group Practice，" Journal of Political EconomyラVo1.98，No.3， pp.544・
573. 
Gibbons， R.(1996)，“Incentives and Careers in Organizations，" NBER Working Paper， No. 5705. 
Gravelle， H.， and Ree， R.(1992)， Microeconomics， 2nd ed.， Addison Wesley Longman. 
Grossman， S. J. and Hart， O. D. (1983)，“An Analysis of the Principal聞AgentProblem，" 
Econometrica， Vol. 51， No. 1， January， pp. 7幽45.
G可ar剖i，D. (1992)， Essentials of Econometrics， McGraw-Hill. 
Harris， M. and Raviv. A. (1979)，“Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information，" 
Journal of Economic Theo;アヲVol.20， No. 2， April， pp.231・259.
Holmstrom， B.(1979)， "Moral Hazard and Observability，" The Bell Journal ofEconomics， Vol. 10， 
No. 1， Spring， pp. 74-91. 
Macho-Stadler， I.， and Perez-Castrillo， D. (1997)， An Introduction to the Economics of 
Iゲormation:Incentives and Contracts， Oxford University Press. 
Milgrom， P.， and RobertsヲJ.(1992)， Economics， Organization and Management， Prentice-Hall. 
Okuno-F吋iwara，M. (1987)，“Monitoring Cost， Agency Relationships， and Equilibrium Modes of 
-109-
Labor Contractsラ竹Journalof the Japanese and Jnternational Economies， Vol. 1， pp.147・167.
Pra民J.W. (1994)， "RiskAversion in the Small and in the Large，" Econometrica、Vol.32， pp. 122-
136. 
Prendergast， C. (1996)，“What Happens within Firms? A Survey of Empirical Evidence on 
Compensation Policies，" NBER Working Paper， No. 5802. 
Shapiro， C. (1983)，“Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations，" The 
Quαrterly Journal of Economics， Vol. 98， No. 4ヲNovember，pp.659-679. 
Shapiro， C. and Stiglitz， J.E. (1984)，“Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline 
Device，" The American Economic Review， Vol. 74， June， pp.433-444. 
Shavell， S.(1979)，“Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship，" The 
Bell Journα1 ofEconomics， Vol. 10， No. 1， Spring， pp. 55-73. 
Tachibanaki， T.and Maruyama， T.(1998)，“Shoushin， Incentives and Chingin，" Nihon Keizai 
Kenかu(“Promotion，Incentives and Wages，" JCER Economic Journal)， No.36， July， pp. 1 -26. 
Weitzman， M. L. (1980)，“The“ratchet principle刊 andperformance incentives，" The Bell Journal 
of Economics， Vol. 1， No. 1， pp. 302-308. 
110 
